1. Introduction {#sec1-ijerph-17-04114}
===============

The maritime industry is the global economic lifeblood, transporting about 90% of global trade, so maritime safety is a vital factor for the sustainable development of international economics and trade \[[@B1-ijerph-17-04114]\]. The maritime industry includes several components such as crew members, maritime regulatory bodies, ships, ship owners, and classification societies, and these components have different effects on safety performance \[[@B2-ijerph-17-04114]\]. Maritime safety has always been an important aspect for the maritime industry because there are numerous dangers that can drastically lead to casualties, environmental pollution, as well as tremendous property damage \[[@B2-ijerph-17-04114],[@B3-ijerph-17-04114],[@B4-ijerph-17-04114]\]. According to the literature review of accident analysis in the maritime industry, most maritime accidents are caused by human errors \[[@B5-ijerph-17-04114],[@B6-ijerph-17-04114],[@B7-ijerph-17-04114]\]. Therefore, it is essential to understand human error and organizational factors contributing to accidents for effective management and policy development in the maritime industry \[[@B8-ijerph-17-04114]\].

The International Maritime Organization (IMO), whose intention it is to create a fair and effective regulatory framework for the maritime industry in order to decrease human errors, has issued a number of maritime conventions. The four main maritime regulatory conventions are International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG), International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), and International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) \[[@B2-ijerph-17-04114]\]. In particular, the SOLAS convention refers to numerous requirements for maritime accident prevention aiming to reduce human errors and improve safety awareness \[[@B9-ijerph-17-04114],[@B10-ijerph-17-04114],[@B11-ijerph-17-04114],[@B12-ijerph-17-04114]\]. Furthermore, the SOLAS convention provides the minimum safety standards for the construction, machine, equipment, operation, and maintenance of ships, and hence SOLAS is regarded as the most significant convention involving the safety of ships \[[@B11-ijerph-17-04114]\]. According to the ship accident data investigated by Tzannatos and Kokotos, the number of accidents is significantly reduced after the International Safety Management (ISM) Code was implemented in 1998 \[[@B13-ijerph-17-04114],[@B14-ijerph-17-04114]\]. Although the maritime authorities have adopted a set of regulations and rules to regulate safety standards, these regulations or rules are not fully effective, and consequently, maritime accidents caused by human errors continue to happen and have not yet fallen to an acceptable level \[[@B15-ijerph-17-04114],[@B16-ijerph-17-04114]\]. In order to reduce maritime accidents as far as possible, it is necessary to pay attention to the types of human errors \[[@B17-ijerph-17-04114]\].

This paper takes three catastrophic maritime accidents as examples to identify different kinds of human and organizational factors in the maritime industry: the Chinese Eastern Star, the Korean Sewol, and the Thai Phoenix accidents. There are several reasons for selecting the three accidents. Firstly, all the three maritime accidents happened in recent years and resulted in loss of property and heavy casualties. Secondly, the three accidents occurred in China, Korea, and Thailand, respectively, and they are all located in the Asian region with similar social contexts. After the capsizing of Eastern Star and Sewol, several scholars conducted detailed analysis on the accident causes \[[@B18-ijerph-17-04114],[@B19-ijerph-17-04114],[@B20-ijerph-17-04114],[@B21-ijerph-17-04114]\]. However, few researchers conducted a comparative analysis on the causes of the three major maritime accidents. Therefore, this paper discusses an in-depth analysis of the underlying causes of the three maritime accidents that happened in three different countries, attempting to explore the similarities and differences about the accident causes under the similar social context. The investigation data of this paper are based upon accident investigation reports, some news articles, and communication with relevant scholars. This study is expected to make a contribution to safety management in the maritime industry. In addition, the abbreviations involved in this paper are presented in [Table 1](#ijerph-17-04114-t001){ref-type="table"}.

2. Brief Introduction of Eastern Star, Sewol, and Phoenix Ferry Accidents {#sec2-ijerph-17-04114}
=========================================================================

2.1. The Eastern Star Accident in China {#sec2dot1-ijerph-17-04114}
---------------------------------------

On 1 June 2015 (Beijing time), the Eastern Star, which is owned by the CESC, departed from Nanjing City and was sailing to Chongqing City. At 21:30, the Eastern Star encountered a squall line system accompanied by strong convective weather, tornadoes, as well as torrential rain. Influenced by strong storms, the Eastern Star capsized in a short time when the ship navigated in the Jianli waters affiliated to the Yangtze River of China. The Eastern Star is a large-scale travel ship that was initially built by the Chuandong shipyard in 1994 and renovated in 1997, 2008, and 2015, respectively. The passengers on board were mostly old people from a travel agency named Sunset Red and most of them were sleeping when the accident happened. The accident caused 442 deaths and was deemed to be the most serious maritime accident since 1949 \[[@B21-ijerph-17-04114]\]. The severe weather is recognized to be the leading cause of the accident according to the accident investigation report.

2.2. The Sewol Accident in South Korea {#sec2dot2-ijerph-17-04114}
--------------------------------------

At 08:58 on 16 April 2014, the Sewol with 476 persons capsized on the way from Incheon port to Jeju Island, and 325 out of the 476 passengers were high school students who were going on a school trip. As an 18-year-old Japanese ship, the Sewol was purchased by the Cheonghaejin Marine Company in 2012. Subsequently, the Cheonghaejin made a series of modifications in a Korean yard to boost capacity in 2013, resulting in the Sewol's instability \[[@B22-ijerph-17-04114]\]. When leaving the port, the Sewol loaded 2142.7 tons of cargo, which was twice the loading limit (987 tons) \[[@B20-ijerph-17-04114]\]. During the navigation, Sewol lost its balance when the inexperienced helmsman made a sharp turn. When the captain communicated with VTS for help, the captain made wrong decisions, specifically, the passengers were instructed to stay in the cabins. When the captain told passengers to evacuate, it was too late---at this time the captain and crew members abandoned the ship and fled. The accident caused 304 deaths, and most of the casualties were high school students. The disaster is recognized to be a national disaster in South Korea \[[@B18-ijerph-17-04114],[@B23-ijerph-17-04114]\].

2.3. The Phoenix Accident in Thailand {#sec2dot3-ijerph-17-04114}
-------------------------------------

On 5 July 2018, the Phoenix went to sea illegally in spite of the weather warning. At 17:45, the ship encountered a severe storm on the way back to Phuket and capsized near Coral Island, resulting in 47 deaths \[[@B24-ijerph-17-04114]\]. The severe weather was recognized to be the direct cause of the accident \[[@B25-ijerph-17-04114]\]. In addition, the crew members did not promptly remind tourists to pay attention to safety and take necessary measures, and many tourists still stayed in the cabin when the ship was about to tilt instead of running to the board, and even many passengers did not wear the lifejacket when the ship was sinking. In addition, the VTS at chalong dock did not receive the distress signal, and the location of the Phoenix disappeared from the positioning system, which may be caused by the severe storm. Moreover, the Marine Office did not take the initiative to contact the Phoenix, which delayed the accident rescue. The Phoenix ferry accident was considered to be the worst travel accident in Thailand's history.

2.4. Overview of the Three Accidents {#sec2dot4-ijerph-17-04114}
------------------------------------

The overview of the three maritime accidents is presented in [Table 2](#ijerph-17-04114-t002){ref-type="table"}.

3. Methodology {#sec3-ijerph-17-04114}
==============

It is significant to choose an accident model because the choice of the model determines the methods of data collection, and the conclusions and the preventive measures could be different. In other words, 'what-you-look-for' determines 'what-you-find', and 'what-you-look-for' depends on the selected method or model employed in accident analysis \[[@B11-ijerph-17-04114],[@B26-ijerph-17-04114]\]. Therefore, it is significant to select a model before conducting an accident investigation. Due to the characteristics of reliability and effectiveness, Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) was considered to be one of the preferred models when identifying the human errors and organizational factors as soon as gathering accident information \[[@B27-ijerph-17-04114]\].

HFACS, which is recognized as an epidemiological model, enables one to analyze the visible and underlying causes \[[@B28-ijerph-17-04114]\]. In 1997, the HFACS was initially developed by Shappell and Wiegmann on the basis of the Swiss Cheese Model to investigate and analyze the data of the military aviation accidents. The HFACS was gradually applied in other domains, such as civil aviation \[[@B29-ijerph-17-04114],[@B30-ijerph-17-04114],[@B31-ijerph-17-04114]\], maritime industry \[[@B32-ijerph-17-04114],[@B33-ijerph-17-04114]\], coal mining \[[@B34-ijerph-17-04114],[@B35-ijerph-17-04114],[@B36-ijerph-17-04114]\], medicine \[[@B37-ijerph-17-04114],[@B38-ijerph-17-04114],[@B39-ijerph-17-04114]\], construction industry \[[@B40-ijerph-17-04114]\], and railway \[[@B41-ijerph-17-04114]\]. However, when applied to other domains, the adapted HFACS model has been proposed by analysts for the purpose of adapting to the characteristics of certain domains. In the maritime domain, there exist many national rules, international agreements, and regulations to ensure the operation of maritime industry. Therefore, according to the features of maritime accidents, this research employs the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System for Maritime Accidents (HFACS-MA) framework to analyze the maritime accidents. The framework is composed of five levels, complying with the core concepts of HFACS and the guiding principles of IMO. In addition, the HFACS-MA model has wide applicability for maritime accidents, including the ship grounding, collisions, and grounding accidents; thus, HFACS-MA framework is a universal model for maritime accidents. Furthermore, HFACS-MA is not limited to management and regulatory mechanisms of countries according to the levels of the framework. Therefore, this paper adopts the HFACS-MA framework to analyze the three maritime accidents. [Figure 1](#ijerph-17-04114-f001){ref-type="fig"} presents the overview of the HFACS-MA framework, and [Table 3](#ijerph-17-04114-t003){ref-type="table"} provides a concise description of categories involved in the five levels of the framework.

With respect to the HFACS-MA framework, some changes have been made by comparing it with the original HFACS model. Firstly, the level of external factors is added into the HFACS-MA framework to capture the contributing factors that go beyond the scope of the organizational level, the additional level follows the application of HFACS model in the mining industry and railroad industry \[[@B34-ijerph-17-04114],[@B41-ijerph-17-04114]\], and is modified according to the situation of maritime industry. The external factors level is grouped into four subcategories: legislation gaps, the deficiencies in the administration, flaws in design, and others. Legislation gaps seek to identify the defects of the current rules or guidelines that provide guidance for the maritime industry and the related organizations. The Herald disaster that happened in 1987 suggested that legislation gaps were the main contributing factors for the maritime accidents \[[@B28-ijerph-17-04114]\]. The deficiencies in the administration emphasize the failures that relevant authorities fail to perform their duties to ensure the implementation of the existing rules or guidelines, and these defects are recognized to be the contributing factors of some accidents. When identifying the factors related to the weak system design, the flaws in design should be paid more attention and added to the HFACS framework \[[@B42-ijerph-17-04114]\]. These defects are often observed and are deemed as the causation factors of an accident, for instance, weak considerations for ergonomics. In addition, some factors that are illustrated in the accident investigation report are categorized as the 'others' subcategory since they do not belong to the categories above, for instance, an improper installation at the shipyard falls into this category. Secondly, the category of personal factors is composed of communication (ships and VTS), resource management, and readiness for the task. In the maritime industry, communication among ships and with VTS is crucial, and poor communication could result in lack of coordination \[[@B27-ijerph-17-04114]\]. Therefore, the communication (ships and VTS) is added to the HFACS-MA framework. The category of resource management is composed of teamwork, communication, and coordination. When the condition of the ship changes, the team will act accordingly and make use of relevant technical, human, and material resources to ensure voyage safety. The category of readiness for the task includes the physical or mental factors that result in failure to be ready for performing the task, for instance, drug use falls into this category.

4. Application and Discussion {#sec4-ijerph-17-04114}
=============================

In this section, the utility of applying the HFACS-MA model to the three maritime accidents is demonstrated. In order to extract the causation factors accurately, four safety experts are invited to analyze the three maritime accidents based on the HFACS-MA framework. Each safety expert needs to extract the causation factors independently according to the accident investigation report and some news articles, and an in-depth discussion about the causation factors is conducted among the four safety experts. When the causation factors are determined, they are classified into the appropriate level based on experts' experience, and a comparative analysis is carried out. Practical implications and limitations are discussed.

4.1. Cause Analysis of the Eastern Star Accident in China {#sec4dot1-ijerph-17-04114}
---------------------------------------------------------

In terms of the Chinese Eastern Star accident, 19 accident causation factors are identified according to experts' experience, and the accident causation factors are listed in [Table 4](#ijerph-17-04114-t004){ref-type="table"}. The classification of the contributing factors for the Chinese Eastern Star accident is shown in [Figure 2](#ijerph-17-04114-f002){ref-type="fig"}.

4.2. Cause Analysis of the Sewol Accident in South Korea {#sec4dot2-ijerph-17-04114}
--------------------------------------------------------

With respect to the Sewol accident in South Korea, the disaster is the result of neglecting safety by government, supervising authorities, Chonghaejin, and the crew members \[[@B18-ijerph-17-04114]\]. Based on the 5 levels of the HFACS-MA model, 23 causation factors of the Sewol accident are identified, as listed in [Table 5](#ijerph-17-04114-t005){ref-type="table"}, and the classification of the contributing factors for the Korean Sewol accident is presented in [Figure 3](#ijerph-17-04114-f003){ref-type="fig"}.

4.3. Cause Analysis of the Phoenix Accident in Thailand {#sec4dot3-ijerph-17-04114}
-------------------------------------------------------

Regarding the Phoenix ferry accident, 17 causation factors are identified based on the five levels of the HFACS-MA framework. [Table 6](#ijerph-17-04114-t006){ref-type="table"} presents the detailed list of the causation factors, and the classification of the contributing factors is shown in [Figure 4](#ijerph-17-04114-f004){ref-type="fig"}.

4.4. Comparative Analysis about the Causes of Three Accidents {#sec4dot4-ijerph-17-04114}
-------------------------------------------------------------

Based on the cause analysis of the three accidents using the HFACS-MA framework, comparative analysis about the causes of three accidents is conducted, and the analysis results are presented in the form of an adapted fishbone diagram, which is shown in [Figure 5](#ijerph-17-04114-f005){ref-type="fig"}. In the adaptation of the fishbone diagram, the "eye" of the fish represents the occurrence of accidents, and the main bone, which is located in the diagram axis, is composed of five arrows with different colors; from the beginning of the diagram axis to the end, the five arrows are in accordance with the five levels of the HFACS model. For the fishbone diagram, we employed the causation factors of the three accidents to fill in the bones of the fish. In addition, the demographics of the causation factors associated with the three accidents are computed and presented in [Table 7](#ijerph-17-04114-t007){ref-type="table"}. In terms of the distribution of the causation factors, there exist similarities and differences in the three accidents. As seen in [Table 7](#ijerph-17-04114-t007){ref-type="table"}, the level of unsafe supervision is the most frequent level for the three accidents, followed by the level of precondition for unsafe acts and unsafe acts. In the following, we make a discussion from the five levels of the HFACS-MA framework.

Regarding the level of external factors, legislation gaps are the primary category associated with the three accidents, especially in the Eastern Star accident and Sewol accident, as seen in [Table 7](#ijerph-17-04114-t007){ref-type="table"}. The Eastern Star accident illustrated that China lacked a specific law to enhance the ability of defending against meteorological disasters; additionally, the necessary devices required by IMO, such as the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS), were not mandatory for Chinese vessels because no corresponding regulations were required by Chinese law. Regarding the Sewol accident, the maximum allowable age of passenger ships was modified to 30 years rather than the previous 20 years by law \[[@B18-ijerph-17-04114]\]. The Ships Safety Act in Korea did not limit the improper renovation of ships, and the KSA and KCG did not realize the new capacity limit after renovation. Additionally the Korean laws did not require the supervising authorities to share information effectively. Therefore, it is important to establish and improve the related legislation for maritime safety.

At the level of organizational influences, [Table 7](#ijerph-17-04114-t007){ref-type="table"} indicates that organizational process is the most commonly organizational factor for the three accidents, which is in line with the existing findings \[[@B31-ijerph-17-04114]\]. The CESC did not establish the system to monitor and manage the Eastern Star, the KCG lacked the standard procedures to communicate with Sewol when they received the distress call, and the TC BLUE DREAM company lacked the basic procedures to popularize safety knowledge when the passengers boarded the Phoenix. Therefore, it is important to establish the corresponding procedures for maritime safety, such as safety management system and rescue communications. In addition, the Eastern Star accident and Sewol accident emphasize the defects in the asset management. Both the Eastern Star and Sewol were illegally renovated, which could make the ship easier to capsize. Therefore, the safety limits of the ship should follow the ship's original design, if the ship is renovated properly, the risk assessment should be conducted routinely to guarantee safety.

As for the level of unsafe supervision, the most frequent categories involved in the three accidents are inadequate supervision and violations in supervision. The efficiency of organizational supervision is one of the influencing factors for the system safety and performance \[[@B35-ijerph-17-04114]\]. [Figure 5](#ijerph-17-04114-f005){ref-type="fig"} and [Table 7](#ijerph-17-04114-t007){ref-type="table"} illustrate that the inadequate supervision is the most frequently supervisory factor associated with the three accidents, which is in accordance with the previous findings \[[@B31-ijerph-17-04114]\]. Taking the Eastern Star for example, CSIB and WSIB did not strictly carry out the ship inspection according to the requirements, and they did not find that CESC changed the ballast tank and water tank without authorization; the cabin doors were not equipped with weathertight closing appliance; the bed was not fixed tightly. Furthermore, the three accidents verified the importance of safety training. Taking the Sewol accident for example, more than half of the crew members on the Sewol were informal workers, and the Cheonghaejin company did not provide adequate training for them \[[@B18-ijerph-17-04114]\]; thus, the crew on board did not provide immediate and accurate actions during emergency; additionally, the rescue workers provided poor initial rescue operation due to the lack of adequate training and climbing equipment \[[@B19-ijerph-17-04114]\]. In addition, violations in supervision were also key contributing factors in the three accidents, which increased the possibility of accidents to some extent. In the safety critical domains, the guidelines of enhancing supervision emphasize the importance of minimizing the violations in supervision.

With respect to the level of precondition for unsafe acts, it was the most vulnerable level since the faults in the ship's hardware could be inspected at a glance. [Table 7](#ijerph-17-04114-t007){ref-type="table"} demonstrates that physical environment and communication (ships and VTS) are the primary categories associated with the three accidents. In terms of the environmental factors, the physical environment factors featured remarkably in the three accidents, specifically, Eastern Star, Sewol, and Phoenix encountered the inclement weather such as the squall line system, which made the ships be under unsafe conditions. In addition, communication among ships and with VTS failed to provide effective support for coordination and accident rescue, which increased the accident losses. Previous research has indicated that the communication among ships and with VTS is essential, which can provide timely information for accident rescue to reduce accident losses.

As the Swiss Cheese Model (SCM) suggests, the defects in the external factors, organizational influences, unsafe supervision, and precondition for unsafe acts result in unsafe acts \[[@B46-ijerph-17-04114]\]. Therefore, we should focus our efforts on some critical categories at these levels to reduce unsafe behavior. [Table 7](#ijerph-17-04114-t007){ref-type="table"} demonstrates that the decision errors and exceptional violations were the main categories at the level of unsafe acts. Decision errors in the three accidents mainly refer to the failure in evacuating passengers in time, and violations are usually related to failure in following organizational procedures. Due to the lack of professional training under the emergency situation, the captain and crew members made wrong decisions and failed to take the proper actions when the emergency emerged. In addition, the violations played an important role in the probability of accidents as all the three accidents related to the deliberate violations of rules and regulations, including the routine violations and exceptional violations. Furthermore, the consequences of the exceptional violations are unpredictable and often cause serious consequences.

4.5. Practical Implications {#sec4dot5-ijerph-17-04114}
---------------------------

This research explores the underlying causes of three maritime accidents by employing the HFACS-MA model, and the results indicate that the HFACS-MA model is applicative in analyzing the maritime accidents. In addition, we conducted a comparative analysis on the accident causes, attempting to explore the similarities and differences about the accident causes under the similar social context. Furthermore, the demographic of the causation factors were computed, and the key categories associated with the three accidents were identified.

Regarding the three accidents, the main focus concentrated on establishing the corresponding legislations, policies, regulations, and safety culture within the maritime industry. Firstly, the legislations that related to maritime safety should be established and improved, which attempts to provide guidelines for maritime safety. Secondly, the standard procedures should be established and improved, including safety management system and rescue communications, and the in-depth risk assessment should be conducted routinely. Thirdly, the crew members on board should receive regular safety training to improve their safety knowledge and safety awareness and finally reduce unsafe acts. In addition, the rescue workers should be properly trained to improve the rescue operations level. Fourthly, it is significant to improve the meteorological warning capability and establish the information distributing platform of meteorological warning. Consequently, this research contributes to safety management and policy development in the maritime industry at different levels.

4.6. Limitations {#sec4dot6-ijerph-17-04114}
----------------

Some materials of this research come from news articles, and one of the limitations is the inadequate data due to the translation obstacle of local language in Korea and Thailand when collecting evidence, which limits the depth of conclusions that we can draw. Furthermore, there are still many unresolved questions associated with the three accidents, such as the path of each accident and the risk assessment of human factors. In addition, this research is limited to accidents caused by Cruise ship and Ro-Ro passenger vessel only. Therefore, if the scope of research is expanded to multiple types of vessels, it is possible to establish effective maritime safety measures for maritime safety. Finally, HFACS was the only method used in this research. While this research was practical, it might be helpful to compare different analytical methods such as 2--4 Model \[[@B47-ijerph-17-04114]\], AcciMap \[[@B48-ijerph-17-04114]\], STAMP \[[@B49-ijerph-17-04114]\], and FRAM \[[@B50-ijerph-17-04114]\].

5. Conclusions {#sec5-ijerph-17-04114}
==============

In this paper, the HFACS-MA model is introduced to explore the underlying causes of Chinese Eastern Star, Korean Sewol, and Thai Phoenix ferry accidents, indicating that the HFACS-MA model is applicable for maritime accident analysis. A comparative analysis on the accident causes of the three accidents was conducted, and the demographic of the causation factors were computed, and additionally the key categories were identified. Consequently, the research can increase support for HFACS-MA and its application, and provide valuable information for safety management and policy development in the maritime industry at different levels.

At the level of external factors, it is important to improve the legislation in the maritime industry, especially in the Eastern Star accident and Sewol accident. At the level of organizational influences, the defects in the organizational process are the key contributing factors for the three accidents, and additionally the Eastern Star accident and Sewol accident emphasize the defects in the asset management. At the level of unsafe supervision, the inadequate supervision and violations in supervision are the primary reasons for the three accidents, and it highlights the importance of adequate safety training for maritime safety. Regarding the precondition for unsafe acts, the physical environment factors featured remarkably in the three accidents, and meanwhile communication (ships and VTS) play an important part in coordination and accident rescue. At the level of unsafe acts, it emphasizes the importance of the following factors: the decision errors and violations. Efforts to reduce unsafe acts should concentrate some critical HFACS categories at the lower levels.

Although this research analyzes the causes of three accidents in detail, there are still many unresolved questions associated with the three accidents, such as the path of each accident and risk assessment of human factors. At the same time, this research provides some new insights to encourage further research to establish effective measures for national and international maritime safety.
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ijerph-17-04114-t001_Table 1

###### 

List of abbreviations involved in this paper.

  Abbreviations   Full Names
  --------------- --------------------------------------------------
  IMO             International Maritime Organization
  HFACS           Human Factors Analysis and Classification System
  MSA             Maritime Safety Administration
  SMS             Safety Management System
  CESC            Chongqing Eastern Steamship Company
  KRS             Korean Register of Shipping
  KSA             Korea Shipping Association
  KCG             Korea Coast Guard
  RMA&PA          Regional Maritime Affairs & Port Administration
  CSIB            Chongqing Ship Inspection Bureau
  WSIB            Wanzhou Ship Inspection Bureau
  YRNA            Yangtze River Navigation Administration
  VTS             Vessel Traffic Service
  PMO             Phuket Marine Office

ijerph-17-04114-t002_Table 2

###### 

A brief description of the three maritime accidents.

  Information                              Eastern Star                                                            Sewol                                                                                                  Phoenix
  ---------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ---------------------------------------------------
  Accident time                            At 21:30 on 1 June 2015                                                 At 08:58 on 16 April 2014                                                                              At 17:45 on 5 July 2018
  Accident location                        Yangtze River of China                                                  Donggeochado of South Korea                                                                            Coral Island of Thailand
  The number of deaths                     442                                                                     304                                                                                                    47
  The type of ship                         Cruise ship                                                             Ro-Ro passenger vessel                                                                                 Cruise ship
  The capacity of the ship                 534 passengers and 50 crew members                                      921 passengers, 35 crew members, 180 vehicles, and 154 regular cargo                                   120 persons
  Construction and modification            Initially constructed in 1994 and renovated in 1997, 2008, and 2015     Initially constructed in 1994 and renovated in 2013                                                    Originally constructed in 2016
  Information about the persons or cargo   403 passengers, 46 crew members, and 5 personnel from a travel agency   325 highschool students, 14 teachers, 108 other passengers, 29 crewmembers, and 2142.7 tons of cargo   89 passengers and 12 crew members
  The registered owner of the ship         CESC                                                                    Chonghaejin                                                                                            TC BLUE DREAM
  Information about Passengers             Most passengers were older adults from a travel agency                  Most passengers were students from the Danwon high school                                              Most passengers were Chinese who travel to Phuket

ijerph-17-04114-t003_Table 3

###### 

A concise description of categories involved in the five levels of the HFACS-MA framework.

  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  HFACS Level                              Error Categories                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   Description
  ---------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  External factors\                        Legislation gaps                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   The defects of the current rules or guidelines that provides guidance for the maritime industry and the related organizations \[[@B28-ijerph-17-04114],[@B41-ijerph-17-04114]\].
  (Level 1)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   

  The deficiencies in the administration   The defects of the relevant authorities in performing the current rules or guidelines, or their oversights in implementing their tasks \[[@B28-ijerph-17-04114]\].                                                                                                                                                                                                 

  Flaws in design                          The flaws in design or usability of equipment or materials used by crew or VTS, which are obstacles to make full use of equipment to perform tasks \[[@B42-ijerph-17-04114]\].                                                                                                                                                                                     

  Others                                   Some factors presented in the accident investigation report that do not belong to the above categories \[[@B8-ijerph-17-04114]\].                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  

  Organizational influences\               Asset management                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   The management, distribution, and maintenance of the organizational assets such as human resources, equipment, and financial resources \[[@B28-ijerph-17-04114]\].
  (Level 2)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   

  Organizational climate                   The working climate involved in the organization, which refers to culture, management structure, and policy \[[@B28-ijerph-17-04114],[@B43-ijerph-17-04114]\].                                                                                                                                                                                                     

  Organizational process                   This category focuses on procedures, formal processes, and the organizational surveillance. Procedures refer to objectives, standards, and documentation. The organizational surveillance includes risk management, development, and application of safety programs. The SMS of the maritime industry is attributed to this category \[[@B11-ijerph-17-04114]\].   

  Unsafe supervision\                      Inadequate supervision                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             The factors that failed to track qualifications and provide oversight, guidance, and training, leading to unsafe conditions \[[@B11-ijerph-17-04114],[@B28-ijerph-17-04114]\].
  (Level 3)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   

  Planned inappropriate operation          The failure in risk management, operational planning, crew arrangement, etc. \[[@B43-ijerph-17-04114]\].                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

  Failure to correct known problems        The supervisors did not redress the known defects in individuals, documents, equipment, procedures or training and allow these deficiencies to continue \[[@B11-ijerph-17-04114],[@B28-ijerph-17-04114]\].                                                                                                                                                         

  Violations in supervision                The existing regulations, guidance, and operating instructions are neglected deliberately by supervisors when performing their duties, resulting in unsafe situations \[[@B28-ijerph-17-04114],[@B43-ijerph-17-04114]\].                                                                                                                                           

  Preconditions for unsafe acts\           Physical environment                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               This category refers to the factors of natural environment, including temperature, lighting, weather, wind, visibility, and currents.
  (Level 4)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   

  Technological environment                This category refers to failures in usability of the devices and instruments, bridge design, and checklist layouts \[[@B11-ijerph-17-04114]\].                                                                                                                                                                                                                     

  Adverse mental states                    This category includes adverse mental conditions such as mental fatigue, inappropriate motivation, self-complacence, and lack of concentration \[[@B28-ijerph-17-04114],[@B43-ijerph-17-04114]\].                                                                                                                                                                  

  Adverse physical conditions              This category includes acute medical, pharmacological and physiological conditions which are known to have a negative effect on performance \[[@B11-ijerph-17-04114],[@B43-ijerph-17-04114]\].                                                                                                                                                                     

  Physical or mental limitations           This category refers to lack of knowledge, time, talent, and skill to perform a task \[[@B11-ijerph-17-04114],[@B34-ijerph-17-04114]\].                                                                                                                                                                                                                            

  Resource management                      This category refers to the management and usability of the relevant technical, human, and material resources that are required to ensure the safe navigation of the ship, including navigation plans, maps, electronic equipment, etc. In addition, teamwork, communication, and coordination are involved in this category \[[@B43-ijerph-17-04114]\].           

  Readiness for the task                   This category refers to the physical or mental reasons that individuals are not ready for performing the tasks. For instance, the use of alcohol or medications \[[@B43-ijerph-17-04114]\].                                                                                                                                                                        

  Communication (ships and VTS)            Communications among the ships are necessary, in addition, failures in communications among ships and with VTS are the main causes of maritime accidents.                                                                                                                                                                                                          

  Unsafe acts (Level 5)                    Skill-based errors                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 Skill-based errors occur when there exist flaws in memory, attention, and technique, and these errors are recognized to be mechanical behaviors \[[@B44-ijerph-17-04114]\].

  Perception errors                        This category is caused by perception problems such as visual sense, auditory sense, and attention problems \[[@B44-ijerph-17-04114]\], and wrong decisions are made due to false perception.                                                                                                                                                                      

  Decision errors                          This category refers to designed and goal-intended behaviors aiming to achieve the goals, yet these behaviors are improper or inadequate. Decision errors include three subcategories: inadequate choices, procedure errors, and errors in processing the problem \[[@B28-ijerph-17-04114],[@B44-ijerph-17-04114]\].                                               

  Routine violations                       Routine violations that are customarily condoned by supervising authorities are habitual behaviors \[[@B45-ijerph-17-04114]\].                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     

  Exceptional violations                   Exceptional violations often result in serious consequences and are not condoned by the management authority \[[@B43-ijerph-17-04114],[@B44-ijerph-17-04114]\].                                                                                                                                                                                                    
  ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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###### 

The detailed list of the causation factors associated with the Eastern Star accident.

  Code   Accident Causes
  ------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  EC1    The necessary devices required by the IMO were not mandatory for Chinese vessels.
  EC2    There was not a specific law to defend against climate disasters.
  EC3    The accident information reporting procedures required by government were cumbersome.
  OC1    The CESC renovated the ballast tank and water tank of Eastern Star without review.
  OC2    The beds had not been fixed for a long time, and the cabin door was not equipped with a weathertight closing appliance as required.
  OC3    The CESC did not establish a system to monitor and manage ships.
  SC1    The CSIB and WSIB did not strictly inspect the ship according to the requirements.
  SC2    The CESC tacitly consented to the Eastern Star's adventurous voyage in dangerous environment at night.
  SC3    The routine inspection from CESC was not serious.
  SC4    The Yueyang MSA did not seriously implement the dynamic tracking and monitoring of passenger ships.
  SC5    The YRNA granted the water transportation license without strict inspection.
  PC1    The Eastern Star encountered a squall line system accompanied by a strong convective weather, tornadoes as well as torrential rain.
  PC2    The Eastern Star and other five ships were involved in the storm at the same time, but the communication among ships could not work properly due to the strong storms.
  PC3    The weather warning issued by MSA was not timely.
  PC4    Most passengers were elderly people with limited mobility, and most of them were sleeping when the Eastern Star capsized.
  AC1    The CESC illegally hired unqualified personnel to renovate the ship.
  AC2    The captain failed to detect the ship's fallback state as early as possible due to the navigation at night.
  AC3    When the ship was about to capsize, the captain neither issued a distress message nor evacuated the passengers on board.
  AC4    The status was not verified in time when Eastern Star disappeared from the positioning system.
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###### 

The detailed list of the causation factors associated with the Sewol accident.

  Code   Accident Causes
  ------ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  EK1    The maximum service life of passenger ships went from 20 years to 30 years.
  EK2    There was no clear regulation on restricting the improper renovation of ships, especially expanding the height.
  EK3    The information sharing issue among supervising authorities lacked a legal basis.
  EK4    Incheon RMA&PA approved the forged document about the renovations of Sewol submitted by Chonghaejin.
  OK1    The Sewol was illegally renovated.
  OK2    The KCG lacked standard procedures for rescue communications.
  OK3    The Chonghaejin employed more informal workers than regular ones.
  OK4    The KSA did not check overload strictly.
  SK1    The Cheonghaejin did not provide adequate training for informal workers on the Sewol.
  SK2    The KCG did not provide professional training for rescuers about the capsizing of ship.
  SK3    The KRS did not strictly inspect the lifeboats.
  SK4    KSA allowed Sewol to set sail without strict inspection, such as the loosened lashing devices and the overloaded cargo.
  SK5    The Chonghaejin grouped and arranged two people with no experience to navigate the dangerous channel.
  PK1    The Maenggol Channel had a strong tidal current with low water temperature.
  PK2    The steering went wrong.
  PK3    One out of 44 lifeboats worked.
  PK4    The communication between the crew members and VTS was not smooth.
  PK5    The emergency response from seafarers was inadequate due to their poor preparedness, inadequate training, or improper understanding of their duties.
  AK1    The captain and crew members instructed the passengers to stay in the cabins instead of taking the lifeboats, while they abandoned the ship and fled.
  AK2    Sewol was overloaded when leaving from the port.
  AK3    Sewol was not equipped with adequate ballast water required by the classification society to keep the ship balanced.
  AK4    When entering the dangerous Maenggol Channel, the captain did not navigate directly but let the inexperienced helmsman grasp the steering wheel.
  AK5    The inexperienced helmsman made a sharp turn.
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###### 

The detailed list of the causation factors associated with the Phoenix accident.

  Code   Accident Causes
  ------ -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  ET1    The business license of the manufacturer for Phoenix had expired.
  ET2    The jacuzzi that was not marked on the design was added. However, the review of the Phoenix was approved by the Thailand MSA.
  ET3    There was no information platform for captains, crew members, and passengers to obtain timely meteorological information.
  OT1    There were insufficient lifeguards and police officers.
  OT2    The TC BLUE DREAM company lacked the basic procedures for popularizing safety knowledge when the passengers boarded the Phoenix.
  ST1    The TC BLUE DREAM company did not provide adequate safety training for the captain and crew members.
  ST2    The PMO had regulatory oversight in wearing lifejackets all the way.
  ST3    The VTS did not contact the Phoenix actively when Phoenix disappeared from the positioning system.
  ST4    The port did not take effective measures to stop vessels from leaving the port in spite of a weather warning of strong winds and waves.
  ST5    Phoenix's design drawings were unqualified but illegally approved.
  PT1    The Phoenix encountered a great storm with strong winds and waves.
  PT2    The drainage system was substandard.
  PT3    The steering of Phoenix was not responsive.
  PT4    The Phoenix and VTS at Chalong dock did not have any communication when encountering the severe storm.
  AT1    The captain and crew members told passengers to stay in the cabin, while they took the lifeboats without evacuating the passengers.
  AT2    The Phoenix went to sea illegally in spite of the warnings of winds and waves.
  AT3    Some passengers did not wear lifejackets.
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###### 

The demographic of the causation factors associated with the three accidents using HFACS-MA.

  HFACS-MA Category                        Eastern Star Accident   Sewol Accident   Phoenix Accident                                               
  ---------------------------------------- ----------------------- ---------------- ------------------------- ---------- ------------------------- ----------
  External factors                         EC1, EC2, EC3           3(15.8%)         EK1, EK2, EK3, EK4        4(17.4%)   ET1, ET2, ET3             3(17.6%)
  Legislation gaps                         EC1, EC2, EC3           3(15.8%)         EK1, EK2, EK3             3(13.0%)   ET3                       1(5.9%)
  The deficiencies in the administration   ---                     ---              EK4                       1(4.3%)    ET2                       1(5.9%)
  Flaws in design                          ---                     ---              ---                       ---        ---                       ---
  Others                                   ---                     ---              ---                       ---        ET1                       1(5.9%)
  Organizational influences                OC1, OC2, OC3           3(15.8%)         OK1, OK2, OK3, OK4        4(17.4%)   OT1, OT2                  2(11.8%)
  Asset management                         OC1, OC2                2(10.5%)         OK1                       1(4.3%)    ---                       ---
  Organizational climate                   ---                     ---              OK3                       1(4.3%)    OT1                       1(5.9%)
  Organizational process                   OC3                     1(5.3%)          OK2, OK4                  2(8.7%)    OT2                       1(5.9%)
  Unsafe supervision                       SC1, SC2, SC3           5(26.3%)         SK1, SK2, SK3, SK4, SK5   5(21.7%)   ST1, ST2, ST3, ST4, ST5   5(29.5%)
  Inadequate supervision                   SC1, SC3                2(10.5%)         SK1, SK2                  2(8.7%)    ST1, ST2, ST3             3(17.6%)
  Planned inappropriate operation          ---                     ---              SK5                       1(4.3%)    ---                       
  Failure to correct known problems        SC2                     1(5.3%)          ---                       ---        ST4                       1(5.9%)
  Violations in supervision                SC4, SC5                2(10.5%)         SK3, SK4                  2(8.7%)    ST5                       1(5.9%)
  Precondition for unsafe acts             PC1, PC2, PC3, PC4      4(21.1%)         PK1, PK2, PK3, PK4, PK5   5(21.7%)   PT1, PT2, PT3, PT4        4(23.5%)
  Physical environment                     PC1                     1(5.3%)          PK1                       1(4.3%)    PT1                       1(5.9%)
  Technological environment                ---                     ---              PK2                       1(4.3%)    PT2, PT3                  2(11.8%)
  Adverse mental states                    ---                     ---              ---                       ---        ---                       ---
  Adverse physical conditions              ---                     ---              ---                       ---        ---                       ---
  Physical or mental limitations           PC3, PC4                2(10.5%)         ---                       ---        ---                       ---
  Resource management                      ---                     ---              PK3                       1(4.3%)    ---                       ---
  Readiness for the task                   ---                     ---              PK5                       1(4.3%)    ---                       ---
  Communication (ships and VTS)            PC2                     1(5.3%)          PK4                       1(4.3%)    PT4                       1(5.9%)
  Unsafe acts                              AC1, AC2, AC3, AC4      4(21.1%)         AK1, AK2, AK3, AK4, AK5   5(21.7%)   AT1, AT2, AT3             3(17.6%)
  Decision errors                          AC3                     1(5.3%)          AK1                       1(4.3%)    AT1                       1(5.9%)
  Skill-based errors                       ---                     ---              AK5                       1(4.3%)    ---                       ---
  Perception errors                        AC2                     1(5.3%)          ---                       ---        ---                       ---
  Routine violations                       AC4                     1(5.3%)          AK2, AK3                  2(8.7%)    ---                       ---
  Exceptional violations                   AC1                     1(5.3%)          AK4                       1(4.3%)    AT2, AT3                  2(11.8%)

Note: "---" represents null; N~C~ represents the number of causation factors for each category in the Chinese Eastern Star accident, and the percentage number relates to all 19 causation factors; N~K~ represents the number of causation factors for each category in the Korean Sewol accident, and the percentage number relates to all 23 causation factors; and N~T~ represents the number of causation factors for each category in the Thai Phoenix accident, and the percentage number relates to all 17 causation factors.
